The giving of your assent (albeit reluctantly) to the evil part of the act would be wrong in itself – regardless of any negative consequences (or indeed any possible “positive” consequences) flowing therefrom. It would be consequentialist to argue otherwise.

But, yeah – it sounds like you’ve got it already, so I’ll shut my trap now.

BA

It seems maybe what you’re saying is, the mere fact that a law enshrines in some people’s minds the notion that certain evil behavior is acceptable (even though laws such as we have been discussing would be objectively illegitimate), makes it evil.

In the case of the second law I proposed, affirming the killing of blue-eyed children but proscribing the killing of green-eyed children, even though it had the good effect of saving the lives of green-eyed children, and no bad effect that didn’t already exist, it nevertheless would re-affirm the supposed legitimacy of the former law allowing the killing of blue-eyed children.

Therefore, even though the evil of having this false notion enshrined in people’s minds, might be less than the evil of killing green-eyed children, you nevertheless can’t use this means to reduce the latter evil, because the means itself is evil, even though it’s a lesser evil than the one it mitigates. You can’t do good through evil means.

Is that it? If not, I would appreciate you correcting me. Thanks for taking the time.

The position which holds that the consequences of an act determine its moral status is called ‘consequentialism’. It was condemned by John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor.

However, if you’re saying that the species of the subject bill is evil, I think maybe I differ in necessarily classifying it as such.

Taking your illustration, a bill making it legal to kill blue- and green-eyed children, would be evil because it creates a situation in which blue- and green-eyed children are liable to be killed.

Later on, if a bill were proposed saying, “The killing of blue eyed children shall not be punishable by any law, but the killing of green-eyed children is henceforth prohibited,” this second law would not create a situation in which blue-eyed children are bound to be killed. That situation would already exist due to the prior law. All the new law would cause is a change in the existing situation such that the lives of green-eyed children are preserved, whereas before they were not. Therefore even though technically it authorizes the killing of blue-eyed children, I would not (I think) consider it evil because that was already authorized, so it has no actual evil effect. And since it has the good effect of preserving the lives of green-eyed children, I might feel bound to vote for it.

The cause of our disagreement may be that I don’t understand the actual situation which is the subject of your original post. I’m not English and have not familiarized myself with the issues addressed in the bill. Perhaps I’m missing something essential.

For example, suppose there were a bill (for which there was a large majority in the Commons) which read,

“The killing of blue eyed and green eyed children shall not be punishable by any law.”

And, suppose someone proposed amending the bill to delete the words “and green eyed”. It would be permissible to vote for that amendment.

Let us imagine that this amendment succeeded. When the bill returned to the chamber it would say,

“The killing of blue eyed children shall not be punishable by any law.”

It would not be permissible to vote for this bill. Were one to vote for it one would be responsible for all the deaths which ensued.

Now imagine the original proposal was passed into ‘law’. (It is not a real law because it conflicts with Natural and Divine Law but the courts will treat it as a law.)

Imagine a few years later there is a proposal to amend the law.

If the amending legislation read,

“The words ‘and green eyed’ shall be deleted from s.2 of The Infanticide Act 2008″

It would be permissible to vote for it.

But if it said,

“s.2 of The Infanticide Act 2008 shall now read ‘The killing of blue eyed children shall not be punishable by any law’”

It would be impermissible to vote for it and anyone who did would be responsible for all the deaths which ensued because he would have enacted a law permitting the murder of blue eyed children. The fact that he did it to avoid the killing of green eyed children would not excuse him.

A moral act is composed of three elements:

1. The Species
2. The Circumstances
3. The Intention

If any one of these is bad the whole act is sinful. It doesn’t matter if the other two elements are sound.

If I kill an innocent to save another I sin, even though the intention is good, because the species of the act is sinful.

If I engage in intercourse with my wife on a public bus I sin, even though the species of the act is good, because the circumstances of the act are sinful.

If I give alms to gain favour in the sight of men I sin, even though the circumstances and the species of the act is good, because the intention is evil.

Thus, if an MP votes for an intrinsically evil legislative proposal to avoid a worse one the fact that his intention (to avoid a worse one) is good does not remove his moral responsibility for whatever is evil in the text he has voted for.

Pilate had Jesus scourged because he believed Jesus was innocent but he thought it would be politically impossible to release Him unharmed. He hoped that the scourging would be enough to appease the crowd. He was wrong. But even if it had appeased the crowd that would not have justified the act. He would still have scourged the Son of God.

“Amen, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me.”