Contrary to the vigour of the Gospel, contrary to the law of the Lord and God, by the temerity of some, communion is relaxed to heedless persons – a vain and false peace, dangerous to those who grant it, and likely to avail nothing to those who receive it. They do not seek for the patience necessary to health nor the true medicine derived from atonement. Penitence is driven forth from their breasts, and the memory of their very grave and extreme sin is taken away. The wounds of the dying are covered over, and the deadly blow that is planted in the deep and secret entrails is concealed by a dissimulated suffering. Returning from the altars of the devil, they draw near to the holy place of the Lord, with hands filthy and reeking with smell, still almost breathing of the plague-bearing idol-meats; and even with jaws still exhaling their crime, and reeking with the fatal contact, they intrude on the body of the Lord, although the sacredScripture stands in their way, and cries, saying,
Every one that is clean shall eat of the flesh; and whatever soul eats of the flesh of the saving sacrifice, which is the Lord’s, having his uncleanness upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people.Also, the apostle testifies, and says,You cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils; you cannot be partakers of the Lord’s table and of the table of devils.He threatens, moreover, the stubborn and froward, and denounces them, saying,Whosoever eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord unworthily, is guilty of the body and blood of the Lord.All these warnings being scorned and contemned – before their sin is expiated, before confession has been made of their crime, before their conscience has been purged by sacrifice and by the hand of the priest before the offense of an angry and threatening Lord has been appeased, violence is done to His body and blood; and they sin now against their Lord more with their hand and mouth than when they denied their Lord. They think that that is peace which some with deceiving words are blazoning forth: that is not peace, but war and he is not joined to the Church who is separated from the Gospel. Why do they call an injury a kindness? Why do they call impiety by the name of piety? Why do they hinder those who ought to weep continually and to entreat their Lord, from the sorrowing of repentance, and pretend to receive them to communion?
Laodicea 
January 21, 2018 at 11:16 am
A contribution in three parts to the debate on Amoris Laetitia:
1) The Sarah case: https://musingsfromaperiphery.blogspot.com/2017/10/the-sarah-case.html
2) The case for absolution: https://musingsfromaperiphery.blogspot.com/2017/11/sarah-is-not-eligible-for-sacramental.html
3) A possible reply to the dubia: https://musingsfromaperiphery.blogspot.com/2017/10/a-response-to-dubia-of-four-cardinals.html
Your thoughts are appreciated.
January 21, 2018 at 1:09 pm
Things done reluctantly are simply speaking free.
January 21, 2018 at 4:30 pm
Yes, but the question is – what exactly is ¨done¨ reluctantly. And more pertinently, even assuming there is something ¨done¨, whether such doing is willed.
January 22, 2018 at 1:57 pm
I don’t see how anyone who was considering the scenario (without having some motive affecting the natural use of reason) would deny that Sarah was choosing that an unlawful sexual relation continue in order to maintain Mohammed’s protection. If it went before a court, M. would not be found guilty of rape since S. would be judged to have consented to his actions.
January 23, 2018 at 11:51 am
With respect, I disagree.
Yes, it is possible to see that a *secular* court may judge S to have consented. But S is before a different court – the ¨tribunal of mercy¨ where words such as discernment, actual intention (check the reference to salpingectomy in the first post), culpability, disposition, Grace, Justice and Mercy still matter.
S simply chooses to exercise a legitimate option suggested by the Church, viz., for the sake of the children´s welfare, to live with him but only as sister and brother. Having both parents together under one roof and looking after the children is what her conscience sees as a good to be pursued. She cannot go back to John because he doesn´t want her back and he won´t look after M´s children. Besides, he has ¨married¨ again.
So, what are her options?
Leaving M implies risking a painful divorce, which, besides affecting the children psychologically, would also result in one parent missing from the home – and if the secular court accepts M´s lawyer´s arguments, one can foresee the custody of M´s children being granted to him >> and that means lesser chances of those children benefiting from a Catholic upbringing.
The other option is to stay with M for the sake of the children but live as sister and brother only. But if he does not agree and forces himself on her, and she just ¨lies there¨ while he engages in coitus, how can that action of his be attributed to her? Is there consent on her part which is sufficiently deliberate to constitute a mortal sin? (Once again, please take note of the analogous reference to salpingectomy.)
Every penitent who comes for Confession is taken in good faith by the priest. When the priest discerns that S is not deliberately choosing an unlawful sexual relation in order to maintain M´s protection, but the actual reality is not what may appear to a secular court, does it make sense to withhold absolution? (At worst, what Sarah can be accused of, as noted in the second post, is a lack of trust in the Providence of God to be the Father for the children, in the event of a messy divorce. But is that grave enough to withhold absolution?)
This is not just about Mercy but also Justice – as in, not accounting for the actual nuances of the case, and simply looking at it from the perspective of secular courts and secular ¨justice¨ would be unjust.
January 24, 2018 at 3:33 pm
“S simply chooses to exercise a legitimate option suggested by the Church, viz., for the sake of the children´s welfare, to live with him but only as sister and brother.” The authorities of the Church have suggested that couples might do this in certain cases, but I don’t think this is one of them.
January 24, 2018 at 4:44 pm
What are those ´certain cases´?
What, in your opinion, should the pastor suggest to S? That she should (?):
1) leave M
2) risk a messy divorce,
3) accept it if a secular court grants custody of M´s children to him
4) lose out on the opportunity to give those children a Catholic upbringing?
Would such suggestion by the pastor be tantamount to replacing S´s conscience?
If S is not prepared to take the above risk because that is against her conscience or because she is paralyzed in fear/anxiety, where do we go from there?
And in addition to your opinion on what the pastor ought to suggest to S, what can or does the Church actually suggest in this case?
January 25, 2018 at 7:05 pm
I think it would be best for her to leave, taking the children with her, so as not to be giving at least proximate and permanent material co-operation with grave sin. For a question so specific, I don’t think there is such a thing as what the Church suggests. I doubt that the old manuals might have considered such a case. It seems unlikely that the court would grant M. custody but if it did, then yes I think that she would have to accept that, offering up her prayers and penances for them.
January 26, 2018 at 4:23 am
‘so as not to be giving at least proximate and permanent material co-operation with grave sin’
Simply saying there is a ‘giving’ of ‘proximate and permanent material co-operation with grave sin’ does not do justice to the nuances of the case. There is no ‘giving’ and there is no ‘co-operation’ on the part of S.
Besides, if what you say is right, then the Church itself can be accused of being complicit in promoting the “giving” of “proximate and permanent material co-operation with grave sin” through its green-lighting of the ‘brother and sister’ solution.
And being ‘complicit’ for quite some time now!… https://reducedculpability.blog/2018/01/22/history-of-the-brother-and-sister-solution/
Also see the last three paragraphs at https://musingsfromaperiphery.blogspot.com/2017/11/sarah-is-not-eligible-for-sacramental.html (the ones comparing S with ‘Gianna’). If Gianna can foreseeably be granted absolution, (cf. AL paragraph 311 and in particular the reference in AL footnote 364 to St. John Paul II’s letter to Cardinal Baum – https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/letters/1996/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_19960322_penitenzieria.html ), what sense does it make to withhold absolution from S? If absolution is withheld from S, but granted to Gianna, what kind of sacramental discipline would that be? How can that be justified?
‘I doubt that the old manuals might have considered such a case.’
Precisely. So, when such a case does come up in the confessional, can’t a pastor who prudently and prayerfully discerns how to proceed, find and rely on the guidance of AL chapter 8, footnote 351 included?
‘For a question so specific, I don’t think there is such a thing as what the Church suggests’.
Right – which is where AL chapter 8 can give some general guidance.
Cf. AL 304: ‘It is true that general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations. At the same time, it must be said that, precisely for that reason, what is part of a practical discernment in particular circumstances cannot be elevated to the level of a rule. That would not only lead to an intolerable casuistry, but would endanger the very values which must be preserved with special care.’
‘It seems unlikely that the court would grant M. custody’
Look at it from M’s (and/or his lawyer’s) perspective – M ‘married’ S, looked and continues to look after John’s children, fathered two children by S; now, all of a sudden, it appears to him that S is being ‘unjust’ and relying on some sort of ‘religious conversion experience’ as a result of which she demands that he abruptly stop sexually desiring the woman whom he considers his wife. Should he just ‘accept’ the turn of events? Even if a secular court is expected to kowtow the demands of every ‘religious conversion experience’, can it be asked to deny a father’s right to fight for custody of his children under the circumstances?
‘but if it did, then yes I think that she would have to accept that, offering up her prayers and penances for them.’
Is that a doctrinal or a pastoral suggestion? And is that the ONLY licit way of going about this? If it is, why is it not enshrined as Church teaching?
The case for absolution as laid out in the second post has also not been addressed. Specifically, what is the obex that hinders absolution?
The bottomline, as mentioned in the original post, the ‘rigorous’ approach to sacramental discipline is licit.
But that is not the only licit method, if we consider AL chapter 8.
February 1, 2018 at 9:33 pm
The confessor also has a conscience. He must decide whether he thinks that a penitent has a true purpose of amendment, and in the case of co-operation in material sin whether it is justified by the circumstances. If he thinks that the penitent doesn’t or that the material co-operation can’t be then he should withhold absolution, and the penitent is free to apply to another priest. The cases where a legitimate ‘living together as brother and sister’ is possible seem to me likely to be extremely rare. S. is materially co-operating in that she is not resisting M. with force.
February 2, 2018 at 3:00 am
‘The cases where a legitimate ‘living together as brother and sister’ is possible seem to me likely to be extremely rare.’
This is now getting into the realm of probability – and that is neither here nor there. The bottomline is that there are situations – rare or not – where a legitimate ‘living together as brother and sister’ is possible.
‘S. is materially co-operating in that she is not resisting M. with force.’
And why does she not ‘resist with force’? At the risk of repetition: Because of fear and anxiety that doing so would lead to his carrying out the threat of civil divorce >> which can precipitate, among other things, in:
(a) (at least M’s) children being psychologically affected by a divorce
(b) the children growing up with one parent missing from the home
(c) S losing custody of M’s children in case their custody is granted to him by a civil court <>.
The confessor cannot ignore the existence of fear / anxiety and the role which they play in imputability. Even the dubia cardinals acknowledge that there can be cases where “subjectively (a person) may not be fully imputable or not be imputable at all.”
‘in the case of co-operation in material sin whether it is justified by the circumstances’
This is akin to saying – as noted by the analogy in the first post – that despite the wording of CCC 2263, the killing of an aggressor during legitimate self-defense is DEFINITELY and ALWAYS intentionally chosen / cold-blooded murder. (A leap of logic!)
Or – as noted by another analogy – akin to saying that in case of extrauterine pregnancy, interventions which don´t cause a direct abortion – such as salpingectomy – are also morally illicit because they involve the intentional choice to murder a baby.
You might as well (erroneously) say that there is co-operation in material sin in those cases too!
‘the penitent is free to apply to another priest.’
Which means you cannot rule out the possibility of another priest who, – not frivolously, but *in good conscience*, determines that the charge of ‘co-operation in material sin’ is simply unsustainable.
AL simply gives general guidance and leaves it to priests on the ground to do the discernment based on the actual facts of a case. A few priests may accordingly determine that there is ‘co-operation in material sin’ and therefore decide to follow the ‘rigorous’ approach to sacramental discipline. But – and I imagine a much larger proportion of priests – would determine otherwise and licitly choose the less rigorous approach, whereby absolution is not withheld.
February 2, 2018 at 4:07 am
As a matter of abundant precaution, I’d like to clarify what I said in the previous post, viz., about priests being able to licitly absolve S in good conscience. Note that their doing so is not based on some false compassion or a watering-down of doctrine but solely based on their honest discernment of the facts. In doing so, they obviously have in mind the following (which are all mentioned in and excerpted from the first post):
(1) ‘If Sarah were to deliberately choose to live more uxorio and engage in sexual acts with Mohammed, she obviously cannot be granted absolution; for doing so would be, as Archbishop Chaput puts it, ¨“accompanying” (her) over a cliff.¨’
(Thus, it is evident that the priest has determined that S is not deliberately choosing to engage in sexual acts.)
(2) ‘Isn´t Sarah´s action akin to a woman prostituting herself out of poverty / to feed her children?
No.
[Such a woman may (eventually?) be ¨ahead¨ (cf. Mt. 21:31c), but although the imputability for the offence against chastity can be attenuated (CCC 2355), the taking of proactive steps to sell herself would be problematic, considering that ´one may not do evil so that good may result from it´ (CCC 1756). In contrast, after her conversion experience, there is no step taken by Sarah to commit adultery, but Mohammed forces himself on her]
This again goes to show the priest has noted that there is no ‘step taken *by Sarah* to commit adultery’ (with respect to what happens *after* her conversion).
Then, in the third post which suggests a possible reply to the dubia, we read the following:
‘If, for the sake of the good of the children, Sarah were to deliberately choose to commit adultery, she cannot be given absolution and Communion. But, as noted earlier, that is not the case. Hence, it is not a question of ´turning an intrinsically evil act into one that is excusable or even good´ but of discerning if the intrinsically evil act is/has actually been deliberately and freely chosen by the penitent.’
In deciding to absolve, the priest also notes the following:
What does it mean when it is said that S ‘wearily puts up with’ M’s advances?
Again, the first post clarifies as follows: ‘Literally, this involves Sarah not encouraging Mohammed´s sexual advances and simply lying still while he engages in coitus.’
The bottomline is – can it be said that simply by ‘reluctantly lying still’ and not ‘resisting M with force’, she acquiesces in the adulterous act or chooses to be raped or that she ‘co-operates’ in material sin?
The priest discerns that this is to be answered in the negative from the facts of the case and hence determines in good conscience that there is no obex hindering absolution.
February 12, 2018 at 8:26 pm
‘”‘the penitent is free to apply to another priest.’
“Which means you cannot rule out the possibility of another priest who, – not frivolously, but *in good conscience*, determines that the charge of ‘co-operation in material sin’ is simply unsustainable.”
It doesn’t actually mean that: it simply states a freedom that a penitent has to go to any priest. A penitent could do the same if a priest told them that it was wrong to burgle the houses of the rich. Even if another priest were able to do as you say in good conscience, I think that the priest would be in error. But in any case all this is a long way from the real problem with Amoris Laetitia, which is that it is being used to destroy the Church’s moral teaching and hence is liable to damn souls.
https://www.ncronline.org/news/theology/cupich-says-amoris-laetitia-changes-how-church-teaches-families-learning
February 13, 2018 at 3:01 am
Thinking that a priest would be in error is one thing. Whether he actually is, is another thing.
‘The real problem with Amoris Laetitia…is that it is being used to destroy the Church’s moral teaching and hence is liable to damn souls.’
As noted in the first post, any Church document (not just AL) – and indeed Scripture itself can be misused / misinterpreted / misunderstood. The problem then is not necessarily with the document.
Let us agree to disagree and keep the matter in prayer.
God bless!