Two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring, as stated in Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different ways in which the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first place is held by the ‘kingdom,’ where the power of government is vested in one; and ‘aristocracy,’ which signifies government by the best, where the power of government is vested in a few. Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rulers are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>– St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIIae, 105, 1.
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To most of our contemporaries the absurdity of hereditary monarchy or aristocracy seems self evident. Why would we select our rulers or even our figureheads on the basis not of talent or virtue but of birth? Few people (still, thank God) would be willing to suggest that such attributes may be guaranteed by selective breeding and a quick glance through the genealogies of the great European dynasties suffices to show that the effort would be vain. Monarchs of great virtue seem forever to be succeeded by decadents and rulers of great ability by incompetents. In fact the conjunction of one or both of virtue and ability in two successive rulers is so unusual that it tends to alter dramatically the course of history. It seems obvious that we should seek the most talented and most virtuous rulers. Indeed, as appointing people to appoint them would itself require a quest for the most talented and virtuous (establishing an infinite regress), there seems no alternative to doing so by universal franchise.
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And yet hereditary monarchy, at least of the limited kind, seems to work and to produce greater stability and prosperity than the system reason would appear to uphold (and expounded by St Thomas). There are a number of negative reasons why this might be. Power may tend to corrupt but it seems the pursuit of power corrupts a great deal faster and more comprehensively. A highly talented and utterly corrupt ruler extremely adept at the simulation of virtue may actually end up being the result of the most rational constitution and such a ruler, insofar as he does not desire to rule for the common good but for his private good and insofar as he still requires the consent of the multitude to rule, will seek to corrupt the multitude into hedonists the easier to bribe them. The ability of such a population to select for talent and virtue will thus be subverted and a downward spiral of corruption and mediocrity will ensue. Hereditary government is a lottery but no more or less than a hereditary citizenry and, so long as the principle is preserved inviolate, it eliminates the corrupting factor of the pursuit of power. Yet it is easy to see that, as in seventeenth and eighteenth century France, power does tend to corrupt and the mores and manners of the aristocracy and ruling dynasty may become so corrupt as to equal the negative effects of ambition and destroy the ruling elite in precisely the same way. The English House of Commons as it was until the seventeenth century would seem to counteract this tendency. By providing a popular veto on new legislation and the raising of subsidy it pushes the elite to operate within certain bounds of competence and decency.
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Furthermore, popular forms of government too often give rise to the idea that legitimate rule as such comes from the will of the people. This is a highly pernicious error leading to tyranny and racialism, for it becomes impossible to determine the frontiers of the people without an unjustified and dangerous hyper-realism about ‘the nation’ and the only way of avoiding permanent revolution becomes the claim that the will of the people has been mystically transferred to their representative(s). These representatives accordingly acquire unlimited power over everything and everyone because, by the logic of necessarily popular sovereignty, each and every citizen must have agreed in advance to whatever their rulers do.
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But these are all highly negative arguments against popular government and hereditary forms have their drawbacks too. Not only do they prescind from virtue and ability but they are also oppressive to the spirit of those born without fortune as well as breeding contempt and pride of blood in its beneficiaries. Even ignoring these factors it would seem that the arguments presented thus far still entail that a popular selection of rulers is the rational constitution and only the ravages of sin could deflect us into a hereditary model. Are there no positive arguments for heredity? Aristotle maintains that all the early states were hereditary monarchies because they arose from the original sovereignty of the family which would seem to argue that hereditary monarchy is quite natural (if a discarded stage of human development). Furthermore, though He at first condemned the people’s desire for a king other than Himself, God Himself then seemed to endorse hereditary government not only by His grudging appointment of Saul but by His oath to David and before that to Abraham and by His use of an hereditary covenant all down to the birth of the Messiah Himself. Could one not argue therefore that the hereditary stage of human political development has passed with the enthronement of the universal hereditary monarch Jesus Christ and it behoves us henceforth to live in a republican polity within the context of His kingship (that is, subject to the correction and supervision of the ecclesiastical hierarchy He established and guarantees)?
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But what of the tendency to corruption which, we have argued heredity works against, and the error of popular sovereignty and the need to give due recognition to the family as the fundamental unit of society? As far as the tendency towards corruption goes it would seem we are in the presence of incommensurable goods. One might seek to avoid it through the institution of a hereditary ruler limited by an elective legislative aristocracy or one might prefer the advantages of a ruler chosen freely from and by the whole population and rely exclusively upon a life tenure to prevent corruption and impeachment procedures or the Papal plenitude of power to identify and dethrone a tyrant. Might not the guarantee of infallibility (combined with the prohibition upon the direct exercise of temporal power by the clergy) replace the safeguards we hitherto provided by heredity? As to the error of popular sovereignty, this can flourish even in the context of a limited hereditary monarchy and can work to destroy an unlimited one. It must be faced head on in any system and refuted by open argument. The question of the family requires a more subtle consideration. One might restrict the franchise to the pater familias or his widow. One could extend the franchise to all the baptised of any age and empower the father or widowed mother of those who had not reached the age of majority to vote on their behalf. Furthermore, as the Roman Republic demonstrates, the avoidance of a hereditary aristocracy need not rule out a hereditary nobility. Boethius grudgingly concedes that nobility at least inspires the descendants to emulate the virtues and achievements of their ancestors. We might add that it would provide an incentive for the new man to work for posterity and give permanent recognition to the constitutive social role of the family across generations as well as in the present.
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I would go so far as to suggest that the form of republicanism outlined above fits with the political ideals of Scripture, St Augustine, St Severinus Boethius, St Benedict, St Dominic and St Thomas Aquinas as well as commending itself to reason and the example of history. Not only that, but it more or less represents the form of government that theoretically obtained in the Roman Empire, at least on paper, at the moment of the Incarnation.
Laodicea 
September 6, 2010 at 9:35 am
Spät aber doch, a few questions:
In every mixed form of government one element predominates. Now, it is clear that S. Thomas means the monarchical element to predominate (cf. De Regno ad Regem Cypri), but isn’t it likely that if the people chose all the rulers, even the monarch himself, that the democratic element will dominate? And in fact, S. Thomas only speaks of the aristocratic element being chosen by people.
S. Thomas repeatedly writes that faction is the evil most contrary to the end of the state, since the end of any community is the unity of order. But isn’t electing the ruler by universal suffrage an infallible recipe for faction?
“In fact the conjunction of one or both of virtue and ability in two successive rulers is so unusual that it tends to alter dramatically the course of history.” Is that really so? It seems to me that one gets this impression largely because most historians have a Machiavellian conception of what makes a good ruler; having two successive rulers with Machiavellian “virtue” succeed each other is perhaps rare, but I think that history has rather more examples of rulers with true political virtue succeeding each other (eg. in the Duchy of Austria under the early Babenbergs).
Doesn’t Aristotle in fact teach upbringing is of prime importance in forming virtue? Is it not to be expected that the a rulers children will be most formed in the virtues proper to a ruler? Does one not in fact see that the very greatest rulers of all have always been the children of rulers?
What makes you think that “people” will in fact chose people on the basis of virtue and ability? Does not experience show that democratic envy is just as likely to make them chose someone to whom they do not feel inferior?
“Yet it is easy to see that, as in seventeenth and eighteenth century France, power does tend to corrupt and the mores and manners of the aristocracy and ruling dynasty may become so corrupt as to equal the negative effects of ambition and destroy the ruling elite in precisely the same way.” Well, that might be true up to a point, but obviously in seventeenth and eighteenth century France there were a whole lot of other social factors at work that contributed to the corruption of the aristocracy. Is it not true that in the Vendee, where the aristocrats still mostly lived on their own land (rather than at court) the corruption was not so great?
“hereditary forms … are also oppressive to the spirit of those born without fortune as well as breeding contempt and pride of blood in its beneficiaries.” Oh really? Isn’t the “oppression of spirit” of which you speak exactly what fallen man is most in need of? Doesn’t man in fact need a lesson in humility and submission? Are you not falling here in to the same error as Le Sillon? “Such are the big words by which human pride is exalted, like a dream carrying Man away without light, without guidance, and without help into the realm of illusion in which he will be destroyed by his errors and passions whilst awaiting the glorious day of his full consciousness. And that great day, when will it come? Unless human nature can be changed, which is not within the power of the Sillonists, will that day ever come? Did the Saints who brought human dignity to its highest point, possess that kind of dignity? And what of the lowly of this earth who are unable to raise so high but are content to plow their furrow modestly at the level where Providence placed them? They who are diligently discharging their duties with Christian humility, obedience, and patience, are they not also worthy of being called men? Will not Our Lord take them one day out of their obscurity and place them in heaven amongst the princes of His people?” (Notre Charge) And as to “breeding contempt and pride of blood in its beneficiaries” isn’t pride bred far more perniciously in those who think themselves great because of their own exertions than in those who ave merely inherited greatness?
“Could one not argue therefore that the hereditary stage of human political development has passed with the enthronement of the universal hereditary monarch Jesus Christ and it behoves us henceforth to live in a republican polity within the context of His kingship” Well, could one not also on the contrary argue that since we now have the true exemplar of government in Christ the King we have all the more reason to conform human government as closely as possible to it? “But afterward, when Christian rulers were at the head of States, the Church insisted much more on testifying and preaching how much sanctity was inherent in the authority of rulers. Hence, when people thought of princedom, the image of a certain sacred majesty would present itself to their minds, by which they would be impelled to greater reverence and love of rulers.” (Diuturnum)
“As to the error of popular sovereignty, this can flourish even in the context of a limited hereditary monarchy and can work to destroy an unlimited one. It must be faced head on in any system and refuted by open argument.” OK, but won’t one’s ability to win “in open argument” be much greater if one has a form of government which better manifests the nature of political authority?
“I would go so far as to suggest that the form of republicanism outlined above fits with…” It also fits much more easily with the form of government now unhappily obtaining throughout the world, and I would go so far as to say would tend quickly to corrupt into modern liberal democracy. What reason do have for thinking that it would not?
Such are a the questions which immediately occur to me. One one really has to do, to see that hereditary monarchy is best, is to take a really close look at what the end of government is. I have tried to do that elsewhere.
September 6, 2010 at 12:12 pm
I think I gave due space to the fact that the ambition for power corrupts more effectively than power itself. Furthermore, I also suggested that the only effective replacement for the self-correcting elements in hereditary monarchy is the proper subjection of the temporal to the spiritual sword. Thus, I am not suggesting that the arguments given are arguments for a secular mixed polity. I do not agree that “S. Thomas only speaks of the aristocratic element being chosen by people.” You seem to be assuming that when he says “the rulers are chosen by all” he is not including the chief ruler among the ‘rulers’ chosen by the people. He does say the chief ruler was not chosen by the people under the judges but he never speaks of heredity but rather of God directly appointing the ruler and this was because “This people was governed under the special care of God”. In fact he never mentions heredity, neither in the Summa nor in the De Regno. He does talk about elective Monarchy in the De Regno, and as a bulwark against tyranny “If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power.” In the case of Christendom as a whole we have a divinely appointed King, God Himself. Thus, all other rulers are subordinate ones.
I would be interested to know who you think are the rulers who have most exemplified both virtue and ability in European history. I can hardly think of a single instance of two in a row in English history at least since the conquest. I suppose Alfred best exemplifies both and he was the son of a King and begot competent successors but he was a youngest son and not expected to succeed and his remarkable virtue and ability certainly changed the course of history.
September 7, 2010 at 8:41 am
I think you are right that the proper subjection of the temporal to the spiritual sword could go some way towards compensating for the loss of the benefits of hereditary monarchy, but I don’t think that it could go all the way. How, for example, would it counter the tendency of electoral systems to cause faction? It is strange that S. Thomas does not discuss this since he is so emphatic that faction is the evil most directly contrary to the good of the state. Perhaps it would have more success in instilling the kind of reverence for rulers which election does so much to undermine, but why not stick with the system which is most likely to foster such reverence in the first place?
You are of course right that S. Thomas does not argue for heredity, and does in the de Regno mention the possibility of the chief ruler being elected; but in the article that you quote he explicitly excludes that possibility, though admittedly this seems to be because of the special circumstances of Israel under Moses.
I would like to know exactly what you mean by “both virtue and ability:” what do you think the difference is? If virtue includes political prudence and justice, then I think virtue is ability. I don’t claim that there have been many monarchs who were of very great virtue (Leopold III of Austria, Louis IX of France, Isabella I of Castille etc. are exceptions), but I think a lot of monarchs have been fairly virtuous, certainly they compare favorably to elected officials in that department. There are a number of cases where I think one sees virtuous rulers succeeding eachother, but the fact is not recognized because Machiavellian historians consider one or other of the monarchs in question as “incompetent” (i.e. not unjust): an example from recent history would be Charles I of Austria succeeding Francis Joseph I.
I still don’t see what the strength of the electoral system is. You say it is self-evident that rulers should be chosen for talent and virtue, but you don’t give any convincing reason to suppose that election will in fact chose more talented and virtuous men than heredity. Again: how do you escape the problem of democratic envy?
It seems to me that heredity is evidently the most fitted to human nature, as Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn once wrote:
September 7, 2010 at 11:29 am
Well it seems clear to me to me that if the rulers are not chosen at all then they can’t be chosen for virtue and ability. If they are going to be chosen then I see no good reason to restrict the choice to a smaller group than the adult population as a whole as this would lead us back to having to select the group that selected that group for virtue and ability. There clearly must be a distinction between virtue and ability. For example, there have been many societies where military ability was an important requirement for a successful ruler others where a sound grasp of economics would be very helpful these abilities are not acquired simply through moral virtue even prudence. Even if the ruler need only be a good person who appoints able ministers answerable to him a skill in reading persons and detecting when they are trying to manipulate or deceive him is indispensible and not automatically attached to the moral virtues or prudence. My argument was that these considerations make the elective mixed polity superior in the abstract but that human sinfulness makes limited hereditary monarchy superior in practice (partly because of its limitations). However, an integrally Catholic elective mixed polity properly subject to the spiritual power would be superior to a hereditary one. I think Franz Josef and Karl are an odd example because Karl was not exactly the conventional hereditary successor of Franz Josef and their reigns saw the eclipse and final destruction of the Habsburg state. The division of blame for this is obviously complicated but it isn’t exactly a success. Able and virtuous hereditary rulers seem to be disproportionately concentrated in the early history of European states. I suspect this is because of the high mortality of rulers at this stage, the looseness with which hereditary principles were applied, the frequency of genuine converts and the fact that election would most likely have led to actual civil war.
I would also suggest that the idea that hereditary monarchy is particularly Catholic or traditional is a bit of a mirage. The Roman Empire was never per se a hereditary monarchy. The Holy Roman Empire was elective (albeit on a very restricted franchise). Heredity in the Church’s own structures has always been seen as exceptional and abusive. Indeed, it was the concept and practice of religious orders which preserved the elective character of the church’s original structures and eventually solved the problems with transposing the democratic element of the Roman constitution onto a vast geographical area. The English Parliamentary system is almost certainly based on the constitutions of the Order of Preachers. There were many republican city states in the Middle Ages and Poland was an elective monarchy for centuries.
The introduction of heredity as a de jure principle is really a result of the Germanic invasions of the Roman Empire and its ossification in later centuries came from the Byzantine lex regia and its offspring baroque Absolutism neither of which were very helpful for the Church. I may be wrong on this, but James VI & I and Robert Filmer are the first people I can recall to defend the supposedly traditional concept of unlimited absolute hereditary and indefeasible monarchy.
September 9, 2010 at 11:47 am
“Well it seems clear to me to me that if the rulers are not chosen at all then they can’t be chosen for virtue and ability.” Yes, that’s obvious, but the question is whether it is (as you claim) self-evident that rulers should be chosen for virtue and ability. Since I’m not convinced that the whole adult population would in fact elect rulers more virtuous/able than the lottery of primogeniture, it does not seem to me that your original principle is in fact self-evident. I admit that it is self-evident that it is better to have virtuous/able rulers than vicious/imbecile ones, but I just don’t see that it follows that the rulers have to be chosen for their virtue and ability, since the attempt to do so often results in rulers being chosen for their mediocrity, (cf. Bush) or skill at flattering the mob (cf. Clinton). Thus it still seems more reasonable to “chose” rulers based on their family connections, given the many other advantages of that system.
“There clearly must be a distinction between virtue and ability.” OK, you win on that, but I still think that our view of history tends to be distorted by the false conceptions of what exactly constitutes virtue and ability, and I think this is rather clearly manifested in the example which you consider “odd” in which a pair of rulers succeeded each other, at least one of whom is considered “incompetent” by historians, because he thought it better to suffer injustice than to commit it.
“I would also suggest that the idea that hereditary monarchy is particularly Catholic or traditional is a bit of a mirage.” I think you yourself have given two excellent reasons for showing that it is nothing of the kind: 1. it is natural 2. it is the form chosen by God Himself for the rule of His Divine Son. The fact that Catholic countries have often not conformed very well to the divine exemplar is not in itself a reason for thinking it un-Catholic to do so more closely. In the text I cited from Diuturnum Illud Pope Leo XIII talks about how one can trace a process that starts out with the Christianization of Europe toward a more close conformity between human government and its source so that, when people thought of princedom, the image of a certain sacred majesty would present itself to their minds, by which they would be impelled to greater reverence and love of rulers. And that brings me to what I think is a key argument for heredity against election: the reverence and love for rulers is fostered far more by a heredity system. As von Kuehnelt-Leddihn points out an election usually ends in the triumph of one faction over another, the victorious faction will see the ruler as their debtor and will feel superior to him, the losing faction will regard him with bitter distrust and might even hope that he is unsuccessful to prove them right, and give them a chance to depose him and bring their own candidate to power. It seems to me that hereditary monarchies are particularly suited to fostering love of the ruler, since the man for whom one sheds one’s blood is descended from those for whom one’s fathers shed their blood. Love of the ruler is essential to political community, since the intrinsic good of political community is concretized in the individual person of the ruler, as S. Thomas says,
One of the gravest dangers of the sort of system that you are proposing seems to me that the principle object of love becomes not the ruler but oneself, or one’s own faction.
And that brings me (once again) to the principle problem that I see with your proposal. Faction. The intrinsic final cause of political community is peace, the unity of order, which is a reflection of the order of the cosmos, which is itself the manifestation in creation of the Divine Goodness, Beauty, and Wisdom. My main problem with popular elections is that they foster faction, and thus work directly against the whole purpose of political community.
“The Roman Empire was never per se a hereditary monarchy.” I think this is an excellent example of the problem I have just been talking about. The Roman Emperors generally came to power through civil war. Once they had established their power, they often tried to heal the disunity they had caused by pretending to be the hereditary successors of past emperors thus they took the names of Caesar and Augustus.
“Unlimited absolute hereditary and indefeasible monarchy,” as it was developed in the time after the Reformation is what I think is principally responsible for giving hereditary monarchy a bad name. I would propose a mixed constitution as envisioned by S. Thomas, but one in which the monarchical element was dominant, and in which the monarch and at least some of the aristocratic elements were determined by hereditary succession. I think that version has at least the virtue of being tried with something like success, whereas the sort of republic that you are proposing as never existed except on paper.
September 9, 2010 at 12:24 pm
Yes, that’s obvious, but the question is whether it is (as you claim) self-evident that rulers should be chosen for virtue and ability.
It is self-evident, and the question is not whether they should be, but whether this is de facto feasible, and really less worse than not doing so.
September 9, 2010 at 2:51 pm
This is beyond me gnädigste! How can there be a question about whether doing something is de facto feasable and really less worse than not doing so, if it is at the same time self-evident that one ought to do the thing in question?
September 10, 2010 at 12:22 pm
I read it in the sense: It is self-evident ideally that rulers should be chosen for virtue and ability; however, in this fallen world, it may not be actually possible to do it, and attempting it may produce worse results than not attempting it.
September 10, 2010 at 12:23 pm
And now what happened again to my avatar!
September 10, 2010 at 4:00 pm
I don’t think I ever said that it was self evident that rulers should be selected for virtue and ability. I said “To most of our contemporaries the absurdity of hereditary monarchy or aristocracy seems self evident. Why would we select our rulers or even our figureheads on the basis not of talent or virtue but of birth?” I then went on to argue that our contemporaries are wrong and that there are many good reasons for hereditary monarchy. I argued that the reasons for elective mixed monarchy are cogent but abstract and are outweighed by the practical advantages of hereditary monarchy except where an elected mixed monarchy is properly subjected to the spiritual power. I did not in fact make the point but it does seem obvious that if one decides to choose one’s rulers rather than institute a hereditary system the criteria of choice should be virtue and ability. I fully acknowledge the strong possibility that these will not in fact be the criteria foremost in the mind of the electors. Even if Franz Josef and Karl had no moral alternative to the decisions which led ultimately to the destruction of the Dual Monarchy that destruction is none the less a failure and not a success. Our Lord is not so far as can be ascertained the heir by primogeniture of David so most of the advantages urged for heredity as a system do not apply to His case. The fact that the family is natural and the state usually emerges from the family does not demonstrate that the state ought always to retain this form. I think some of the arguments you propose for heredity have value but I do not think they outweigh the abstract superiority of the system expounded by St Thomas. The USA is an example of a system similar to that St Thomas suggests which has been very successful on one level while exhibiting all the drawbacks upon which we agree.
September 10, 2010 at 6:46 pm
I should add that Leo XIII does not mention heredity in the passage in question (or elsewhere). The specific example he goes on to give is ‘the institution of the Holy Empire’ (which was not hereditary) and by the logic of chronology the earlier passage should be alluding to the anointing of Pepin which was of course a violation of the hereditary principle.
September 11, 2010 at 9:03 am
Sorry for repeatedly misreading you. I am not used to discussing these matters with people with whom I am so much in agreement about the first principles of politics. I think you make the best case that I have seen for election by the entire population, but I still think that the benefits of the hereditary system outweigh those of election (even in the abstract).
There have of course been examples of systems similar to that which you propose, but as far as I know none that have included all the elements of your proposal. It would be fascinating to see how such a republic, with universal suffrage, rulers elected for life, and proper subordination to the spiritual sword, would play out in real life. Maybe if there had been a few less socialists and nazis in 1930s Austria the Dolfuss regime would have ended up something like that.
Our Lord is not biologically descended from David, but the Gospels put a lot of emphasis on the fact that he is legally David’s successor—which is all that a lot of hereditary monarchs can say about their relation to the founder of their house.
It is true that Leo XIII was not talking about heredity in the passage I cited, but I that the principle he enunciates, “different kinds of authority have between them wonderful resemblances,” coupled with the fact that Christ the King is an Hereditary monarch constitutes an argument for heredity.
September 11, 2010 at 10:56 am
I think, on the basis of Romans 1:3, one would have say that Our Lord is biologically descended from David (through His mother). The point I was making applies equally to St Joseph and was that the Lord is not descended from David according to a system of primogeniture (Salic or Norman) but is simply of his house. Many of the advantages rightly attributed to heredity as a form of government are tied to a strict system of seniority which removes the element of choice from the succession. While the covenant and the kingship were transmitted by heredity in the OT it was not in this way. Often God preferred a younger son or rejected the oldest or ignored seniority altogether (among tribes and individuals).
September 14, 2010 at 2:10 pm
Regarding the spiritual sword, an interesting case in our own civilization is Ireland, whose constitution begins with an invocation of the Trinity and privileges the Catholic faith. The legal effect is that the document is interpreted in accordance with Catholic social teaching–the High Court at times cites to Papal encyclicals and Council documents to determine the meaning of concepts like justice or community; under this legal regime, such magisterial documents have legal effect.
September 14, 2010 at 8:12 pm
I am an admirer not so much of the mechanics of the Irish Constitution (I would favour an executive presidency and an upper chamber of elder statesmen) but of its ideological tone and of course its marvellous preamble. However, the section on religion was amended in the seventies so that it no longer makes any explicit mention of the Catholic Church as such and even in the original text I believe it calls the Church the “Holy, Roman, Catholic and Apostolic Church” by avoiding the use of the word “One” it avoids formally admitting the truth of the Catholic faith as such (even though it goes beyond pure reason in invoking the Trinity). I fear this was the original sin of the text, the imperceptible crack through which many other problems have crept.
September 15, 2010 at 4:08 pm
I am sorry to discover my appreciation of the Irish constitution is somewhat out of date. I do agree that an effective, rather than ceremonial, President and a Senate that lives up to its connotations as a body of elder statesman are preferable–I think the American model generally superior to the Westminster model on these scores, though I can’t claim to be unbiased as an American myself.
I wonder what either of you gentleman would make of the reply to sancrucensis’s objection that elections encourage the electors to focus their love on their faction rather than the ruler; that in the electoral systems we have now, the ruler is properly regarded as a sort of vicar under the law or the constitution. For example, in America, public officials, military officers and servicemen, lawyers, judges and legislators take oaths of fidelity to the Constitution–the Constitution takes the place the Monarch would occupy in older systems as focal point of national unity and affection, and embodiment of sovereignty. In this understanding, being opposed to a President of another party is not like belonging to a faction arrayed against one’s sovereign King, but more like being opposed to a chief minister who is separate from the actual sovereign.
This is not to say I do not grieve that the US Constitution’s attempt to forestall the rise of political parties failed; I would agree with President Washington that “The common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it. It serves always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeeble the Public Administration. It agitates the Community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection.”
I would also urge anyone who hasn’t to read the Polish Constitution of 1791. It outlines a system as close to what aelianus has advocated as closely as any that I know of, and a tragedy of modern history is that foreign invasion and domestic treason prevented its going into effect.
September 15, 2010 at 7:09 pm
Ah but the Constitution of 1791 abolished the elected monarchy and replaced it with a hereditary one! Though it did commence “In the name of God, One in the Holy Trinity” (very good, if not as fulsome as the Irish) and stated, while guaranteeing freedom of religion to non-Catholics, that “The dominant national religion is and shall be the sacred Roman Catholic faith with all its laws. Passage from the dominant religion to any other confession is forbidden under penalties of apostasy.” I’m not sure what those penalties were. I’m told Stanisław II August (by the grace of God and the will of the people King of Poland etc.) wrote to George Washington to praise him for retaining the monarchical principle in the US Constitution. Of course, they were both wicked freemasons.
September 15, 2010 at 9:00 pm
Good points. I suppose we are left with the United States as the closest approximation of a Thomist republic, oddly enough. I would be interested in finding that letter from Stanislaw II August to George Washington, if it was sent. I certainly think the Presidency was the signature innovation of the Constitutional Convention, in the history of governments. And while Washington was a Freemason, he at least didn’t go in for the mystical, secret society aspects of it.
September 22, 2010 at 5:44 pm
[…] of Laodicea. I have been discussing the most abstract kind of armchair politics with Aelianus recently, but I thought that he was in far away Britain. We spoke after Mass, and he asked whether the […]